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The firm as a common. 
The case of the accumulation and use of capital resources in co-
operative enterprises 
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Contemporary literature dealing with the governance of the exploitation of common-pool 
natural resources was initiated by Elinor Ostrom in 1990, and has been growing fast ever 
since. On the contrary, within the same research stream, the study of the presence and 
economic role of common resources in entrepreneurial-organizational is, to date, under-
researched. This work endeavours some attempt to fill this gap by: first, spelling out a new-
institutionalist framework for the analysis of the accumulation and governance of common 
capital resources within organizational boundaries; second, by considering co-operative 
enterprises as the organizational form that, on the basis of historical record, and of 
behavioural and institutional characteristics, demonstrated to be the most compatible with a 
substantial role for common and non-divided asset-ownership and with its governance 
thereof. The economic forces influencing the optimal level of self-financed common capital 
resources in co-operatives are enquired. Also their governance is brought under the spotlight, 
evidencing: (i) the constraints that need to be fulfilled, and the potential benefits arising out 
of their presence; (ii) the compatibility and mutual adaptability between democratic 
governance in co-operatives and the governance of non-divided assets.   
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The firm as a common. 




Following the growing evidence on the necessity to accomplish environmentally 
sustainable economic development, the study of the governance and exploitation of natural 
resources gained prominent role in economics and the social sciences, ever since the seminal 
contribution by Elinor Ostrom in 1990 (Ostrom, 2007; Frischmann, 2013; Hodgson, 2013; 
Pennington, 2013; Cole, Epstein and Mcginnis, 2014). Common goods are subtractable, 
hence characterized by high degree of rivalry in consumption and/or utilization, but by a low 
degree of excludability for subjects entitled to the exploitation of the good. They appear as 
private good to outsiders, but are common goods for insiders. Common-pool natural 
resources (CPRs) are studied to highlight the necessity to limit exploitation of fringe and flow 
resources to a level that does not damage the productive potential of the stock, or core 
resource. Institutional mechanisms identified in rules regulating access and management are 
needed to enforce appropriation rights and their limits (Ostrom e Basurto, 2011). This 
research stream came to concentrate on self-managed common property regimes, which 
cannot be simply equated either to public or to private ownership, but share some features of 
both, and have been highlighted as the most typical way in which natural resources are 
managed and exploited (Ostrom, 1990). More recent literature concentrated on forms of 
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communitarian ownership generating positive externalities as concern knowledge/cultural 
commons (Frischmann, 2013), and urban spaces (Sacchetti and Campbell, 2014; Sacconi and 
Ottone, 2015). 
Mechanisms governing the use and exploitation of common resources and the resolution 
of conflict thereof have been studied to overcome tragedy of the commons situations, as in 
Hardin (1968). Given the rival and non-excludable nature of such resources, conflict over 
their appropriation and over-exploitation are to be considered endemic. The technology used 
and the governance structure are functional to adequately regulating appropriation, by 
limiting the risk of conflict and by punishing the violation of appropriation and working rules 
(Ostrom, 2010; Ratner et al., 2010). Governance, besides limiting the risk of opportunism by 
the involved parties, is also functional to the coordination of collective action (Lopes, Santos 
and Teles, 2009). Adequate coordination can be achieved not only by controlling and 
punishing defectors, but also through proper involvement and deliberation processes based on 
membership rights and other consultative and participative practices, which can allow and 
add value to improved information circulation, and the creation of new specific knowledge 
and organizational trust (Meinzen-Dick, Mwangi e Dohrn, 2006; Poteete, Janssen e  Ostrom, 
2010). 
The analysis of the governance of common resources has been applied to the 
entrepreneurial and organizational realms only to a notably limited extent. Some streams of 
literature in law and economics did start this field of enquiry, by defining business 
corporations as a form of “team production” (Blair and Stout, 1999) and by enlarging the 
concept of corporate governance to include a wide array of mechanisms mitigating risk and 
uncertainty in contractual relations (Deakin and Hughes, 1999), and to represent the multi-
stakeholder corporate embodiment of the social contract (Sacconi, 2004). Some authors got to 
identify corporate dimensions that can be likened to common goods, and business enterprises 
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have been explicitly understood as “commons” themselves (Deakin, 2012; Sacconi and 
Ottone, 2015). However, to the best of the author’s knowledge, no contribution has 
systematically analysed the corporate patrimony within the common-pool resources 
framework, and explicitly discussed in this line the specific features of “alternative” or 
“heterodox” enterprise forms, such as co-operatives, social enterprises, and entrepreneurial 
non-profit organizations (Lichtenstein, 1986), exception made for rare exceptions, such as 
Navarra (2011) on capital resources in worker co-operatives and by Perilleux (2017) on co-
operative finance. This contribution is directed to widen the literature evidencing the 
analogies between business corporations and their patrimony with common goods, to study 
the features and economic functions of common-pool capital resources and to evidence the 
specificities of co-operative enterprises as organizational form suited to accumulate common-
pool capital resources.   
One initial key question in this study concerns the reasons why such analysis is largely 
absent in contemporary economics and management literatures. The proposed answer 
concerns the dominant system of property rights, whose concentration and exclusivity limits 
the economic and managerial relevance of communality in the ownership of enterprises.
1
 
This work concentrates on common resources understood as non-divided and non-
divisible ownership of capital assets in firms. The accumulation of owned capital is observed 
in all entrepreneurial forms, since it is needed to finance investment programs, to buffer the 
organization against negative unpredicted events, and to serve as collateral guarantee in 
favour of external finance. Capital resources can be characterized by a positive degree of 
communality in all ownership forms (public, private and co-operative) when the relevant 
                                                          
1
 Since priority is given to the analysis of the private sector, only investor owned companies and cooperative 
enterprises are considered in this paper. Occasional references to publicly owned organizations may solely have 
an exemplifying role. 
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operative and strategic decisions are taken by a collectivity of controlling patrons (the 
resource cannot be easily made excludable) and the “exit” option is costly. The utilization of 
a limited and rival stock of assets coupled with a low degree of excludability in decision 
making can engender a “tragedy of the commons situation” characterized by free riding in 
contribution and over-exploitation. In this field of enquire, co-operative enterprises are 
identified as privileged organizational contexts since, both in their historical origin and 
institutional evolution, they have been characterized in most countries by the presence of 
capital resources that are non-divided and non-divisible among their members. 
The strategy of the paper is as follows: Section Two deals with the definition, economic 
relevance, pattern of emergence and optimal dimension of non-divided capital funds in both 
investor owned companies and co-operative enterprises. The origin and spread of common 
capital resources in co-operatives is analysed within a new institutionalist frame by 
comparing their costs and benefits, both transactional and productive, with the costs and 
benefits of individually held capital resources. Section Three studies the consequences of the 
spread of common capital resources for the governance structure and self-directed production 
of working rules in co-operatives. Critical elements and positive potential of co-operative 
governance are analysed. Section Four concludes. 
 
2. Common resources in investor owned and in co-operative enterprises 
The diversity of organizational forms in terms of control rights can induce important 
differences in the analysis of the presence and modalities of utilization of common resources. 
The paper briefly considers investor owned companies (IOFs hereafter) first, and then 
introduces the case of co-operative enterprises. 
Common capital resources in investor owned companies   
6 
 
The strictly private nature of capital resources in IOFs strongly reduces as a norm, and often 
eliminates the relevance communality, since shares are saleable and, in most cases, 
ownership is concentrated in a few hands. Decision making becomes exclusive, and 
excludability in utilization is perfect after contractual constraints have been fulfilled 
(Sacchetti, 2013). This is the standard observed solution in small to medium sized firms, and 
in family businesses, which are numerically dominant in all contemporary economies. 
However, even in the case of IOFs, capital resources can acquire a relevant degree of 
communality when the firm is constituted as joint stock. More specifically, as the number of 
stockholders increases, and no stockholder achieves dominant position (ownership is 
dispersed), costly exit due to sunkness of capital resources and investments and to asset 
specificity can induce a high degree of rivalry in the utilization of resources and in the 
appropriation of the surplus. In the same situation, non-excludability in decision making, in 
the utilization of assets, and in the distribution of value added is likely to be high as well.
 2
  
As said, a high degree of rivalry and non-excludability is to be considered, in IOFs, as 
exception, not as the rule, due to concentrated ownership. Furthermore, even in the presence 
of a high degree of non-excludability in decision making and capital utilization, the “exit” 
option represented by the sale of stocks can allow stockholders to recoup the value of their 
financial investments. In other words, the sale of owned stocks can be the preferred choice 
whenever non-excludability in decision making leads to a “tragedy of the commons” situation 
                                                          
2
 This argument is ever more valid in widely held joint-stock and in publicly quoted companies characterized by 
fragmented shareholdership in which no dominant position is detected. However, in these companies, the 
emergent dominant role of the management due to separation between ownership and control can reduce the 
problems related to communality thanks to centralized decision making (Berle and Means, 1932). The same 
result would not be possible in co-operatives since, in their case, managers are appointed by members’ 
representatives, and need to respond more closely to their preferences (Hansmann, 1999). In this case, 
communality and the connected behavioural biases such as free-riding can represent a more serious challenge.     
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in which individual objectives conflict with collectively optimal choices, and organizational 
costs are inflated by the growth of decision making costs. Conversely, stockholders may in 
many situations prefer concentrated to dispersed ownership since the former solution allows 
for the elimination of inefficient and costly collective choices when asset specific and non-
recoupable investments make the exit option costly. These remarks can explain the 
prevalence of concentrated ownership in IOFs in most contemporary economies. At the other 
extreme of the spectrum, sole-proprietorship or closely-held joint-stock are found.  
 
Common capital resources in co-operative firms 
Co-operative enterprises are here understood as mutual benefit organizations characterised by 
membership rights that are not based on financial investments, but instead set up on the basis 
of the “one member, one vote” rule (Birchall, 2010; Borzaga and Tortia, 2017). Indivisible or 
common reserves of capital in co-operatives, when they are present, are owned by the 
organization itself and cannot be shared among individual members, who enjoy a form of 
usufruct of the assets, but cannot appropriate them.
 3
 The accumulation of indivisible 
reserves, or asset lock, has the primary function to self-finance investment programs, to 
create collateral guarantees protecting external financial supporters, and to insure the 
membership against negative unpredicted events (Tortia, 2007; Navarra, 2011). Democratic 
and participative governance in the presence of non-divisible, hence not excludable, but 
scarce and subtractible capital resources engenders social dilemmas that are typical of the 
utilization of common resources: conflicting objectives in collective decision making can 
entail substantial governance costs. Costs depend both on rivalry (alternative uses and 
                                                          
3
 In some national systems, however, members can appropriate the residual value of the organization upon its 
liquidation or conversion. 
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appropriation of proceedings patterns may not be mutually compatible, and there can be 
overexploitation of limited resources) and of non-excludability (since all members have the 
legal right to participate on an equal basis, collective decision making can become complex, 
lengthy and contested, while conflict over the appropriation of the surplus can become 
endemic). 
Legal constraints 
Three main institutional models for the accumulation of capital resources in co-operative 
enterprises are singled out in western economies. In the first model, which mainly lies within 
the common law tradition, reserves of capital are, as a norm, divisible among members. 
Forms of common ownership are not mandated and, in some cases, excluded by law. They 
may be allowed when spontaneously created by individual organizations, and included in 
their bylaws. If we take the United Kingdom as the most relevant example in this kind of 
institutional tradition, we notice that, until recent years, bona-fide co-operative socieities 
registered under the 1965 Industrial and Provident Act where not allowed to accumulate 
common or indivisible reserves. The possibility to introduce restrictions to divisibility of 
capital in companies’ bylaws was introduced in the reformed 2002 Industrial and Provident 
Act and in the Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies Act in 2003. However, at the 
present stage of legislative development, the possibility for co-operatives to introduce a fully-
blown asset lock is still barred by law, while it is allowed in community benefit societies 
since 2006 (EURICSE, 2010).
4
  
                                                          
4
 The asset lock regulation for community benefit industrial and provident societies has been in force and 
available for use since 2006 (The Community Benefit Societies Restriction on Use of Assets Regulations 
2006/264). They implement the provisions of the 2003 Act to “lock in” the value of the assets and resources of a 
community benefit society. (cfr. : http://www.thenews.coop/32865/news/banking-and-insurance/uk-co-op-law-
2010-summary/ ).  
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The second and the third models are, instead, mainly found within the civil law tradition of 
continental Europe. In the second model, which includes France and Spain as national cases, 
the creation of indivisible reserves of capital that cannot be shared by members during the life 
of the organization is mandated by law, but such reserves can be appropriated upon 
dissolution, sale, or conversion of the enterprise. In the third model, which is found mainly in 
Finland and Italy, compulsory accumulation of net residuals into indivisible reserves is 
coupled by the prohibition for members to cash in the residual value of the organization also 
upon its dissolution, sale, or conversion. The two civil law models share similarities, but also 
important differences. The former is characterized, comparatively, by stronger financial 
incentives, since members can appropriate the residual value of the organization. However, at 
the same time, the patrimony is less stable since divisibility in case of dissolution or 
conversion can represent, itself, an incentive to stop operation and cash in any residuls value 
(Pérotin, 2013). Conversely, the latter model can suffer from too weak financial incentives, as 
evidenced in the undercapitalization hypotheses by Furubotn and Pejovich (1970), and Vanek 
(1977), but, at the same time, has been showing a high degree of patrimonial stability since it 
does not offer incentives to demutualize or shut down operations. In both civil law systems, 
however, net operating losses can be imputed to indivisible reserves. This possibility can, in 
principle, weaken patrimonial stability since it is liable to mismanagement and unlawful 
appropriation.
5
 Finally, in the US context, a similar legal categorization exists, though in this 
case the main divide is drawn between co-operatives and non-profit organizations. Only the 
                                                          
5
 The system of capital accumulation in the former Republic of Yugoslavia can be interpreted a radical version 
of the civil law system. Under Yugoslav self-management legislation all positive net residuals had to be 
reinvested in invisible reserves, whose function was to finance investments and absorb operating losses in the 
presence of a strict capital maintenance requirement, when prevented any reduction of the net book value of 
capital (Jossa and Cuomo, 1997).   
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latter are characterized by capital indivisibility, even if legislation does not forbid to mutual 
benefit organizations to impose indivisibility (Hansmann, 2001). 
Divisible and indivisible reserves of capital 
This section introduces a new-institutionalist account of the process of formation and of 
the economic motivations leading to the accumulation of non-divided forms of capital 
ownership in co-operatives. Building on the framework developed by Hansmann (1988, 
1996, 1999, 2013), the basic category of transaction costs is considered and sorted into the 
two sub-categories of the net costs of (i) the governance of common resources, when they 
exist; (ii) individual ownership of the shares of capital of the co-operative. The costs attached 
to the two sub-categories are compared in order to single out the optimal level of common 
resources. 
Co-operative enterprises can self-finance themselves in two fundamental ways: either by 
means of capital shares owned individually by members, or by resorting to non-divided and 
non-divisible reserves of capital, which take the form of the asset lock.
6
 In the former case, 
individually owned financial instruments can have, and indeed have in different national 
contexts, pronouncedly different features, since they can be differentiated on the basis of 
yearly yields and reimbursement rights held by the member. Reimbursements rights can take 
different forms, since they can: (i) be perpetual and not refundable by the enterprise, albeit 
they may, under specific circumstances, be sold on the so-called market for membership 
rights (Dow, 1996, 2003), or pay annuities to incumbent members (Storey, Basterretxea and 
Salaman, 2014); (ii) be refunded when the member quits the organization; (iii) be refunded 
independently of the position as incumbent member under looser temporal constraints (Dow, 
                                                          
6
 For the sake of simplicity, intermediate forms of common ownership in which indivisible reserves exist, but 
they can be appropriated by members upon closure or conversion of the c-operative are not considered.  
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1996, 2003; Ellerman, 1986). Finally, members can finance their organization also by 
subscribing firm loans or bonds. 
Members’ individual ownership of capital shares leads to capital variability whenever the 
shares need to be paid back to quitting or incumbent members (a situation common in most 
national systems of co-operative legislation); when shares are transformed into debt capital 
upon quittance of the member; and also when members can sell their shares on the market to 
non-members, since in these cases (refund, sale or transformation into debt capital) the total 
amount of owned capital is reduced. The intensity of capital variability is proportional to the 
percent of total capital individually held by members, and to members’ turnover. Insofar as it 
can reduce and make uncertain the total dimension of the patrimony of the organization and 
its ability to constitute collateral guarantee for the firm's liabilities, variability can represent a 
limit to investment processes and to the ability of the organization to borrow on the market 
(Tortia, 2007; Pérotin, 2013). By constituting indivisible reserves, locked assets effectively 
counteract capital variability.
7 
                                                          
7
 In Italy, all typologies of cooperative enterprises (worker, consumer, producer and user cooperatives) are 
required by law to reinvest at least 30% of their net residual earnings into indivisible reserves of capital, which 
cannot be shared among members both during the life of the organization, and also upon its dissolution or 
conversion. This constraint is increased to 70% in the case of cooperative banks. Any residual value is to be 
transferred to national or regional funds controlled by co-operative associations, which finance the start-up of 
new co-operative ventures. Empirical evidence shows, however, that a dominant proportion of Italian 
cooperatives reinvests close to 100% of net residuals into locked assets. That is, the legal requirement is not 
nearly binding. This evidence supports the idea of the existence of an endogenous process of formation of 
locked assets in cooperatives (Navarra, 2011). As term of comparison, the Mondragon group of cooperatives in 
the Basque country can be considered. In this case net residuals are partly distributed to incumbent members 
(about 70%, though this percentage has been varying over the years), who are mandated to reinvest their 
individual shares of capital in the cooperative as long as they are members; while the remaining share of net 
residuals is reinvested into indivisible reserves (Ellerman, 1986, 2007; Tortia, 2007). Due to members 
withdrawing the shares when they quit or retire, the total amount of the group assets held in common funds is, to 
date, about 50% (MCC, 2015).  
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A second function of non-divided ownership is found in the necessity to counteract the 
risk of  demutualization, that is the termination of a co-operative through the sale of assets, or 
through conversion into a IOF. When the capital is individually owned, its variability coupled 
with members’ turnover can lead to undercapitalization: the co-operative would have to 
refund or transform into bonds or loans a high share of owned capital, thus leading to 
increased dependence on external finance, higher leverage and lower collateral guarantees 
(Tortia, 2007; Pérotin, 2013). When this problem becomes severe, the co-operative can be 
forced to demutualize in order to increase owned capital (equity) and reduce leverage. 
Clearly, co-operative members individually owning large shares of capital can also decide to 
demutualize in order to cash in the value of their individual assets. This problem is especially 
severe in best and worst performing organizations: in the former case, high value added co-
operatives are characterized by market value of individual shares that is substantially higher 
than their face value, and this difference can represent a powerful incentive to liquidate the 
market value and convert into a IOF.
8
 In the latter case, the risk of demutualization can create 
financial incentives favouring demutualization itself. When the organization fares negative 
financial conditions, members may be induced to sell out individual shares or the whole 
enterprise to external investors to reduce expected financial losses, this way aggravating the 
firm crisis. These remarks evidence that individual ownership, though it can strengthen 
financial incentives, is likely to substantially increase the patrimonial instability. 
Demutualization is more common just in those institutional contexts that require or favour 
members’ individual ownership of capital, typically in common law countries (cfr. For 
example Battilani, Balnave and Patmore, 2015, on Australia). The limited number of co-
                                                          
8
 This has been the reason for the disappearance of the well-known group of lumberjack plywood cooperatives 
in the US pacific North West:  the high market value of members' individual shares of capital made the sale of 
these organizations to IOFs more convenient than the sale of individual shares to new incoming co-operators.   
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operative enterprises in these countries can be partially explained not by the higher death rate, 
but by the lower rate of creation and conversion into IOFs (crf. Burdin, 2015, on the ability of 
co-operatives to survive, on average, longer than IOFs). To exemplify, one well-known 
demutualization wave of co-operatives, mutual insurance companies, building societies and 
credit unions took place in the United Kingdom during the ’80ies and the early ‘90ies of last 
century. In continental Europe, instead, demutualization has been less often observed. The 
lower rate of conversion contributes to the stronger presence and impact of co-operatives on 
national economies, and this evidence can be easily correlated with the much larger diffusion 
of non-divided reserves of capital, which depends on the legally mandated (partial) 
reinvestment of net residuals into locked assets.
9 
While in civil law countries the accumulation of indivisible reserves is, as a norm, 
required by law, common law countries, for example the UK, are witnessing in recent years a 
new trend favouring the diffusion of non-divided forms of capital accumulation. Constraints 
on divisibility, reimbursement and sale of individual shares are often introduced in the bylaws 
of co-operatives, social enterprises and employee owned companies by conferring either part 
or the whole patrimony into locked assets or trust funds (Erdal, 2011; Sacchetti e Campbell, 
2014). The spontaneous emergence of forms of common ownership in institutional contexts 
in which they are not mandated by law confirms their substantive economic relevance and the 
potential for wider diffusion. 
The legally imposed accumulation of indivisible reserves showed to be effective in 
preventing demutualization, but has been repeatedly accused to lead to dynamically 
inefficient investment choices, implying under-investment and under-capitalization (Furubotn 
                                                          
9
 In Italy, demutualization of co-operative enterprises is allowed by law only following their renouncing the 
whole value of indivisible reserves. This value needs to be paid out by the demutualizing cooperative to national 
and regional funds financing cooperative start-ups. 
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and Pejovich, 1970; Vanek, 1970, 1977; Jossa and Cuomo, 1997; Perotin, 2013). Even if the 
empirical evidence is not completely univocal, the phenomenon of undercapitalization due to 
suboptimal reinvestment of net residuals into locked assets and to the limited access to 
financial markets due to the absence of tradable equity has been taken as fundamental 
explanation of self-selection of co-operatives into low capital intensive sectors and of the 
reduced rate of creation of new co-operative ventures (Bartlett et al., 1992; Bonin, Jones and 
Putterman, 1993; Podivinsky and Stewart, 2006; Burdin, 2015). However, the ability of at 
least some forms of co-operative enterprises in some specific sectors, for example producer, 
agricultural and consumer co-operatives, to survive and prosper in many countries, even 
when the assets of the organization are held in indivisible reserves, and some successful co-
operative experiments, such as the Spanish Mondragon group of worker co-operatives, leave 
open the possibility to develop further models of co-operative finance at least partly based on 
common ownership (Henrÿ, 2012; cfr. Jossa and Cuomo, 1997; Jossa 2014 on models of 
externally financed worker co-operatives under public ownership). The exact nature of 
property rights as concerns: (i) their legal definition as public; socialized (as in the former 
Yugoslav system); co-operative (as in some European countries); or private (as in common 
law countries); (ii) the structure of reserves in terms of reimbursement rights; residual rights 
on the firm’s assets; the possibility to reduce reserves following negative economic results; 
(iii) the balance between individualized and common ownership,  all appear to be key 
elements of sustainable capital accumulation, the overcoming of undercapitalization; and the 
prevention of demutualization (Henrÿ, 2012). In the reminder of this section, some initial 
systematization of the forces at stake in this process of institutional development is carried 





The emergence of common capital resources 
The foregoing arguments can be better systematized by analysing the economic forces 
which favour the emergence of an optimal amount of indivisible capital reserves. These 
forces need to underpin the stability of accumulated capital and of entrepreneurial processes, 
without renouncing financial incentives to invest optimally and increase productivity. In this, 
it should be noted, in the most notable and competitive examples of co-operative and 
employee owned enterprises, mixed forms of capital ownership are found. Individualized, 
non-divided, and mixed forms can be singled out in specific cases. In the Mondragon group 
in the Basque region of Spain, non-divisible reserves of capital coexist with large shares of 
capital held directly by members in internal capital accounts (Ellerman, 1986, 2007). In the 
John Lewis Partnership in the UK employees' appropriation rights are strictly regulated and 
limited by the patrimony capital being held in trust funds, which cannot be shared among 
members at any time, but which entitles incumbent employees to annual dividends. In many 
employee owned companies, not all the patrimony is held in trust, and the presence of both 
individually owned shares and of trust funds is common (Erdal, 2011). This evidence 
suggests that capital in such ownership forms can be decomposed into different parts, which 
contribute in different ways to the financial health of the firm. The different parts have 
different functions: while non-divided ownership is mainly geared to guarantee stable and 
reliable investment processes and to build collateral guarantees, individual ownership 
improves financial incentives and performance. 
In a new-institutionalist perspective it is necessary to ask what are the costs attached to the 
transactions involved in each of the two forms of ownership, and their optimal dimension 
thereof. As already anticipated, individual financial instruments are characterized by high 
costs connected to members’ turnover, which in turn depend on members’ different temporal 
horizons of permanence as incumbent members and on heterogeneous members’ objectives. 
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When members show homogeneous temporal horizons and preferences, transaction costs 
connected with membership and with individual financial positions are low since 
homogeneity simplifies and lowers the costs of collective decision making, this way limiting 
conflict and turnover. These elements favour the continuation of the dominance of individual 
ownership. The well-kwon examples of professional partnerships and of the group of worker 
owned plywood co-operatives in the US Pacific Northwest in the XXth century share the 
presence of a highly homogeneous membership performing similar professional and work 
tasks and having similar educational levels (Craig e Pencavel, 1992, 1994; Hansmann, 1996; 
Pencavel, 2001; Dow, 1996, 2003). In such cases, non-divided ownership is usually not 
observed since owned capital and organizational processes can be relatively stable and 
members would aim at maximizing financial incentives by means of individual ownership 
(Dow, 1996, 2003). In the framework presented in this paper, members’ homogeneous 
preferences imply that rivalry in utilization of capital resources and non-excludability in 
collective decision making can be more easily managed. Since the tasks performed by 
different members are similar, the number of different ends to which capital can be put to use 
is limited and rules governing utilization of resources and the equitable sharing of the surplus 
are more easily devised and implemented. As complexity and dimension increase, 
homogeneity fades away, members’ objectives become heterogeneous and more difficult to 
reconcile, this way fostering both organizational and financial instability (Hansmann, 1996). 
Different preferences concerning investment processes, organizational models and 
distributive patterns, and different temporal horizons make collective decision making less 
straightforward and more costly, this way increasing governance costs, members’ turnover 
and the risk of demutualization.  
Insofar as it forces the organization to internalize and control, by means of administrative 
procedures, the costs engendered by individual ownership, non-divided ownership represents 
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one possible remedy, which can give back stability to the financial structure of mutual-benefit 
organizations, even in the presence of complexity and heterogeneity of preferences. However, 
non-divided ownership can engender costs and inefficiencies of its own.    
One classical problem concerning non-divided ownership has to do with underinvestment 
due to members’ truncated temporal horizon, which arises when the median member is 
characterized by less than optimal (too short) time horizon for investment programs. This 
problem is common especially in worker co-operatives due to high members’ turnover and 
median age. It engenders lower than optimal investment schedules and higher then optimal 
distribution of income and dividends to members, this way leading to under-capitalization 
(Futubotn e Pejovich, 1970;  Vanek, 1970, 1977; Furubotn, 1976; Pérotin, 2013). Under-
capitalization is also expected to be more pronounced in declining and low value added 
sectors of activity, leading to the disappearance of co-operatives in such contexts. Under-
capitalization can be effectively counteracted, even in the presence of non-divided ownership, 
in at least three cases: (i) when the temporal horizon of the median member is sufficiently 
long and new younger members are constantly associated to the co-operative; (ii) when 
ownership is mixed and individual shares of capital are found side by side to common 
ownership, since in this case individual shares would finance the short term component of 
capital (Tortia, 2007; Pérotin, 2013); (iii) when members’ and/or directors’ decisions are 
informed by social preferences that weigh positively the welfare of future generations of 
members. In this last case, optimal investment schedules are the result of intergenerational 
solidarity or of positive reciprocity by the incumbent generation of members towards 
previous generations who handed over the existing stock of capital (Borzaga and Tortia, 
2017). 
Non-divided ownership can represent an effective institutional device substituting 
individual ownership only if the new emerging costs of governance are properly controlled 
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through governance, working rules and managerial decisions. In an evolutionary 
interpretation, common ownership represents an emergent feature of collective action that 
overcomes individual ownership and the attached contractual costs in the presence of 
complex and heterogeneous members’ objectives (Sacchetti and Tortia, 2015). In more 
general terms, the interpretation of entrepreneurial action as exclusively attached to and 
explained by individual objectives and behaviour is overcome in favour of collective action 
(Connell, 1999; Spear, 2012; Vieta, Tarhan and Duguit, 2016).
10 
The optimal amount of non-divided capital resources in co-operative enterprises 
The costs and inefficiencies that are likely to be attached to the governance of common 
capital resources, which derive from the spread of conflict over appropriation and from 
opportunistic behaviours, are clearly evidenced in the literature concerning “the tragedy of 
the commons” (Hardin, 1968). They can be high in the absence of adequate regulation 
(Ostrom, 1990), and this implies that the advantages deriving from common ownership need 
to be compared with its costs, and with the corresponding costs and benefits attached to 
individual ownership. 
The comparison of costs and benefits is complex as it requires analysis of transactional, 
operational, and welfare generating or depleting dimensions. However, it offers a vantage 
point from which empirical research can depart. On the costs side, the equilibrium between 
                                                          
10
 A non-reductionist interpretation of collective action and institutions as emergent social dimensions, which 
cannot be explained in terms of individual behaviour alone, but are nonetheless anchored to individual 
behaviour, is found in prominent contributions to institutional and evolutionary economics (Ostrom, 1990; 
Hodgson, 1993, 2006). 
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common and individual ownership derives from the balance between two categories of net 
costs attached to the two different ownership regimes:
11
  
(i) costs deriving from the governance of common resources, plus efficiency losses in 
terms suboptimal investment decisions (horizon problem) and absence of highly 
powered financial incentives. Costs of governance include lengthy and inconsistent  
decision making processes, conflict over rules governing exploitation of resources and 
distribution of proceedings, inefficient choices which privilege the median voter 
preferences over average preferences;  
(ii) costs deriving from contractual imperfections attached to individual ownership, which 
can engender organizational impasse, higher turnover and de-mutualization. They 
derive from conflict over strategic decisions concerning alternative investment plans 
and their temporal horizon, resource allocation and utilization, and appropriation of 
proceedings. 
Governance becomes the crucial organizational dimension regulating the internalization of 
contractual costs and their transformation into governance costs (Ostrom, 2009; Ostrom, 
Janssen e Anderies, 2007). It also bears relevant implications on the alignment of members’ 
objectives with organizational objectives, as the non-divisibility and the non-saleability of 
common assets not only has empowering effects on collective action, but it also implies the 
presence of reconstitutive downward effects that tend to modify and refine individual 




                                                          
11
 A detailed comparison of the benefits attached to different ownership forms is outside the scope of this paper, 
which is limited to the cost side.   
12




3. The governance of common capital resources 
The previous section concentrated on the economics of non-divided capital resources and 
on the reasons for their emergence in co-operative enterprises. This section concentrates on 
their governance. In this, a long tradition in new-institutionalist theory is exploited (Ostrom, 
1990; Hansmann, 1996; Williamson, 2000). Oliver Williamson (2000) evidences that 
ownership rights, insofar as they govern control over capital resources and distribution of the 
stream of proceedings, are strictly interconnected with governance. While control rights 
represent the deepest institutional layer in any organizational setting, governance identifies 
the structure of rules, both externally imposed by law and internally self-produced, that allow 
the utilization of resources and the implementation of the production process. Different 
control rights influence governance in different ways: while in IOFs governance is functional 
to shareholder value maximization, in co-operatives it is functional to members’ welfare 
improvement. 
Beyond the legally formalized side of governance, this work mainly addresses forms of self-
regulation, which develop through the issuing of bylaws and working rules at the 
organization level. Working rules embody the modalities by which organizations arrange 
coordination between the involved actors and prevent deviant behaviours. They can be both 
enabling and constraining as spelled out in the original definition of institutional economics 
by John Commons (1931). The literature on common-pool natural resources evidenced that 
their governance, as examined in a long list of cases worldwide, is based on control and 
conflict resolution mechanisms, which aim at the correct exploitation and regeneration of the 
resource in the presence of tragedy of the commons-type dilemmas (Ostrom, 1990; Ratner et 
al., 2010; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2006; Poteete et al., 2010). More specifically, the conditions 
that allow the exploitation of CPRs characterized by scarcity, rivalry in utilization, and non-
excludability have been related to three principal conditions: (i) the possibility for the 
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utilizers of the common resource to participate in the gathering activity, and obtain its fruits; 
(ii) prevention and resolution of conflict; (iii) control of users’ behaviour and punishment of 
violations of collectively defined rules and decisions. This general framework can be 
reinterpreted and applied in some of its fundamental elements to the case of co-operative 
enterprises, when these are interpreted as collective entrepreneurial ventures which 
accumulate and use non-divided capital resources characterized by a high degree of rivalry 
and non-excludability. 
 
The governance of common capital resources in co-operative firms 
If a comparison is drawn between the exploitation of CPRs and the utilization of non-
divided capital resources in co-operatives enterprises, it is possible to observe important 
similarities in institutional patterns, especially in governance, in terms of rule development 
and enforcement mechanisms. Members have the right to decide about the pace of 
accumulation and the modalities of utilization of common resources, which are unavoidably 
rival in their utilization. 
Accumulation, use and distribution of proceedings deriving from the utilization of 
common resources are strictly connected since, in most cases, new resources are used to 
substitute the outdated and worn-out ones, and reproduce the rivalry of past patterns of 
utilization and distribution. Different investment plans can engender distributive patterns that 
favour specific groups of members more than others. The accumulation of common resources 
in democratically managed, membership based organizations can lead to conflict more easily 
than in the case of concentrated ownership in IOFs, since different groups of members can 
prefer different investment plans on the basis of the differential stream of benefits accruing to 
each group. Utilization is itself liable to conflict for similar reasons: access to a given stock of 
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resources can be regulated in different ways and favour the objectives of specific groups of 
members more than others. Finally, conflict over the distribution of proceedings generated by 
common capital resources can be heightened by non-excludability in decision making 
induced by democratic membership, since all members share the same rights to access and 
share proceedings, but different regulation concerning how critical decisions are taken can 
create different patterns of income generation and distribution.  
Rivalry and non-excludability in the utilization of common resources in co-operatives 
create a complex two way process characterized by polarized forces serving different 
functions. Equal rights, which are functional to implementing bottom-up organizational 
processes delivering fair procedures and outcomes, are matched by centralized governance, 
which instead serves, as a norm, the strategic objectives of the organization, which include 
performance and remuneration on the basis of desert. For example, in worker co-operatives, 
equal membership rights induce, as a norm, highly egalitarian patterns of resource utilization, 
professional growth and distribution of proceedings. However, centralized governance would 
often direct investment plans and resource utilization towards the creation and acquisition of 
more demanded skills and competences that foster performance, engendering, this way, 
unequal distributive patterns, since better skills and competence need to be better rewarded to 
eschew the risk of quittance of best performing workers. 
Given the high degree of non-excludability in decision making processes, their regulation 
becomes critical also to prevent the insurgence of opportunism (Olson, 1965). Opportunistic 
behaviour can take different forms, some of which are common to most organizational forms, 
while others are specific to co-operative enterprises. In the former category fall shirking (sub 
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optimal delivery of job effort) in worker co-operatives;
13
 the delivery of low quality inputs in 
agricultural and other producer co-operatives; or the production and circulation of insufficient 
or distorted information in banking co-operatives. Graduated punishment of defectors may be 
necessary as means of last resort to deter and counteract opportunism (Ostrom and Basurto, 
2011). However, peer pressure, fair procedures and members’ involvement, especially when 
their development is guided by intrinsic, more than extrinsic, motivations, can often represent 
devices sufficient to marginalize the recourse to sanctions (Stiglitz, 1990; Berger and Udell, 
2002).  
In the latter category, excessive or distorted exploitation of capital resources can be 
included. Excessive exploitation of capital corresponds to overgrazing in a tragedy of the 
commons situation, and is obtained when the private, not the social, cost of its utilization 
equals the additional revenue generated by the resource.  Members’ may be induced to 
overuse the capital stock, since the costs of utilization and depletion are borne by all members 
collectively, while individual benefit attached to depletion can be higher than the cost. 
Distorted utilization can arise when the dominant group or coalitions of members (the ones 
holding majority votes), administrators or managers divert the utilization of resources 
towards private objectives aiming, for example, at generating larger income streams in their 
favour, or at obtaining privileged working conditions. Distorted utilization of resources in co-
operatives follows, as a norm, different patterns relative to IOFs since, in the former case, it 
can arise from lobbying and positional power held by specific groups of members, while in 
                                                          
13
 In IOFs the instruments used to counteract workers’ shirking and free-riding usually range from dismissal, to 
heightened hierarchical control, to the payment of higher than equilibrium efficiency wages and other monetary 
incentives (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). In worker cooperatives, instead, shirking is more often counteracted by 
horizontal monitoring (peer pressure), involvement in decision making and by the implementation of fair 
procedures and distributive patterns (Borzaga and Tortia, 2016).  
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IOFs it is more likely to depend on top-down, exclusive decisions taken by a restricted group 
of owners (Sacchetti, 2013).  
Regulation recognising the specific features and risks attached to co-operative governance 
is needed to prevent and counteract misbehaviour. In this, procedural and distributive fairness 
criteria have been evidenced to play a critical role in the absence of centralized decisions 
taken by fiat. Indeed, third sector organizations, and especially co-operative enterprises, 
appear to be equipped with particularly high standards of  procedural and distributive fairness 
(Benz and Stutzer, 2003; Tortia, 2008). 
 
Self-production of rules as general solution to governance failure 
A continuous process of self-production of rules is considered essential to stabilize 
expectations and reduce conflict as organizational complexity increases since members in a 
co-operative enterprises are, as a norm, in the best position to work out rules forestalling 
conflict and opportunism, given their better availability of information, and the accumulated 
experience concerning the features of the production process and sector of operation (Ostrom, 
1990; Gutiérrez, Hilborn and Defeo, 2011; Ostrom and Basurto, 2011). 
The process of elaboration of self-defined rules, and of punishment mechanisms in 
prisoners’ dilemma situations, such as public goods production and the tragedy of the 
commons, came under close scrutiny also in the experimental literature. Peer pressure and 
punishment of defectors appear to be prominent and closely intertwined with the evolution of 
social preferences and institutions, since the violation of positive reciprocity expectations in 
collective action engenders punitive reactions (Fher, Gächter and Kirchsteiger, 1997; Fehr 
and Gächter, 2000b, 2002). These general contributions match philosophical interpretations 
of co-operative enterprises evidencing the founding relevance of reciprocity (Zamagni, 2005), 
25 
 
and theoretical contributions dealing with effort provision as a form of reciprocal gift in 
worker co-operatives (McCain, 2007). Empirical evidence coming both from case studies on 
the governance of CPRs (Ostrom, 1990) and from the experimental literature on public goods 
games (Fehr and Gächter, 2000a) is concordant on the relevance of graduated punishment, 
which is observed to grow more severe as the seriousness of the offence increases. The peers’ 
disapproval is translated into explicit or implicit punishment. Explicit punishment can take 
several forms, ranging from fines, to reduced remuneration and career prospects, to formal 
exclusion. Implicit punishment can be detected in informal exclusion and marginalization. 
The foregoing arguments show the strong similarities existing between the management 
and exploitation of CPRs, on the one hand, and the accumulation and use of non-divided and 
non-divisible capital resources in co-operative enterprises, on the other hand. Differences, 
however, should not be forgotten as well, as they engender important differences in 
governance rules as well. While the exploitation of natural resources results in final 
consumption or in saleable production by appropriators, governance of the utilization of 
capital in entrepreneurial organizations fulfils more complex objectives. It represents not a 
simple input, but the result of complex investments processes, which require planning and 
lengthy decision making processes. Furthermore, capital accumulation also fulfils higher 
level needs of both producers and consumers. These have to do with intrinsic motivations 
(e.g. professional and personal growth on the producers’ side, the attainment of the preferred 
lifestyle on the consumers’). All the more so in co-operative enterprises, in which members 
different from financial investors (workers, consumers, producers, etc…) are allowed to 
express such needs and aspirations through participatory governance (Sacchetti and Tortia, 
2015). In this, common capital resources and the self-defined rules governing their utilization 
can represent a fundamental empowering factor in allowing the fulfilment of both monetary 
and non-monetary members’ needs and aspirations. 
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The entrepreneurial and mutual benefit nature of co-operatives increases behavioural, 
institutional, and organizational complexity relative to other entrepreneurial forms (Cheney et 
al., 2014). The recognition of the rival and non-excludable nature of the resources used 
represents a necessary premise to the working out of effective regulation since, for example, 
the features of the technologies used need to be coherent with collective decision making, and 
with the widest possible access to material and immaterial capital by the whole membership. 
Wider access and involvement are expected, in turn, to reduce conflict, opportunism, and the 
need for punishment. Increased coherence between the ability of resources to satisfy 
individual and collective needs, and decision making processes informed by members’ 
involvement can result in increased productive capacity and productivity. As said, studies 
show that co-operative governance requires and guarantees high standards of procedural and 
distributive fairness, and that fairness is strongly associated with members’ wellbeing (Benz, 
2005; Tortia, 2008). Given the increased complexity in organizational dynamics relative to 
the case of natural resources and to other entrepreneurial forms, intensive research is needed 
to support the development of co-operative governance in the presence of non-divided capital 
resources. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
This work represents a first attempt to reformulate the problem of the ownership of capital 
in co-operative enterprises by analysing it in a new perspective, which looks at how common 
or non-divided capital resources can bear productive and welfare increasing potential, and not 
necessarily represent, when properly regulated, an anomaly in or obstacle to the working of 
entrepreneurial organizations. This new viewpoint can allow taking some steps towards 




In this, the paper has had two main objectives: (i) to explain, within the new-
institutionalist approach, the pattern of emergence and spread (both spontaneous and legally 
constrained) of non-divided reserves of capital, interpreted as subtractible and non-excludable 
assets, and to identify the main economic forces defining their optimal level thereof. The 
answer has been found in the complex comparison between the transactional operational 
costs attached to individualized vis à vis common reserves of capital; (ii) to offer an initial 
analysis of the correspondence between the presence of indivisible reserves of capital and the 
main features of participative and democratic governance in co-operatives.  It has been 
stressed that common resources, when tragedy of the commons-like social dilemmas are 
overcome, can represent a fundamental and empowering tool allowing members to achieve 
higher welfare, both monetary and non-monetary, and to fulfil their expectations. Social 
dilemmas need to be faced by flexible governance solutions which use involvement and fair 
organizational patterns to prevent lack of commitment, and peer pressure and sanctions to 
forestall opportunism. As already evidenced in the literature analysing collective governance 
of CPRs, members and their representatives are in the best position to work out the most 
effective governance solutions. While the paper focuses on the similarities between the 
governance of CPRs and the governance of non-divided capital ownership in co-operatives, 
differences should not be forgotten as well on the way to its implementation, since they can 
help identifying critical institutional elements, and welfare increasing dimensions that are 
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